In this paper we explore the patterns of interactions between military expenditure shares in the MENA region over the period 1979-2007. We explore if there are latent common factors that impact on the military expenditures of 15 countries in the MENA region and whether these factors can be interpreted. Unobserved common factors induce cross-sectional dependence and may lead traditional panel-time series estimators to be inconsistent. To identify these latent factors we apply the Principal Component Analysis. We evaluate the interpretation of the estimated factors using the Multiple-Indicator Multiple-Cause model. We found that there is a substantial evidence of cross-sectional dependence in the MENA region, induced mainly by two unobserved factors, but these factors are difficult to interpret.
INTRODUCTION
Since the work of Richardson (1960) on arms races and Olson and Zeckhauser (1966) on alliances, a large body of literature has developed providing quantitative models of military expenditure. A country's military expenditures are usually seen as a function of ability to pay; perceptions of internal and external threats, with the external threats reflecting the behaviour of potential enemies and allies; and the operation of domestic institutions which shape threat perceptions. The arms race and alliance effects are usually measured by other countries military expenditures, since these are usually the only available proxies, but these leave out the effects of qualitative influences such as military technologies, morale, strategy etc. Such omitted qualitative factors will not only cause the estimates to be biased, if they are correlated with included regressors, but will induce correlations between the errors in different countries. If there is an unmeasured technological or strategic development in a particular country, it will not only effect the military spending of that country, it will cause a response in the military expenditure of that country's allies and enemies.
The shift in US policy in the 1960s from massive retaliation to flexible response is an example.
This was a large change, which is usually approximated by a dummy variable, but there are many other smaller changes. This is a matter of particular concern in a closely coupled region like the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), where there are many sociological and economical connections, which means that strategic events have wider repercussions. Over the period studied ) the region has been the stage for the Arab-Israeli conflict and associated clashes; substantial Superpower involvement; an eight year war between Iraq and Iran (1980-1988) A feature common to the region is a lack of legitimacy of the ruling authorities such that internal dissents often break out in violent confrontations. Governments often lack legitimacy and feel threatened by various groups, including separatists and militant islamist groups; not rarely, governments use force to suppress the Islamic militants as it happened in Algeria and Egypt (1993) .
The socio-economic causes behind such resurgence are reviewed in Maddy-Weitzman and Inbar (1997) . These forms of instability are domestic sources of shocks but their occurrence is a regional phenomenon. Also, they have repercussions across-borders while fomenting rivalries or tense relationships as the Algerian-Moroccan tensions demonstrated. Either geopolitically or domestically driven, these sources of shocks impact on the perception of threat to which the military expenditures respond.
Similarly there are poorly quantified economic shocks which may influence more than one country, such as oil price variations which are shared across the MENA region through labour migration (Richards and Waterbury (2008) ) or variations in foreign aid. Thus there is reason to believe that the military expenditures of the MENA countries are intertwined by a variety of arms races, alliances, economic and sociological factors and that the available quantitative measures may not fully capture these interconnections leaving omitted common factors in the residuals of equations estimated for each country. With a single time-series or a single cross-section, there is nothing that one can do about such factors, but with panel data there is a possibility of identifying them. That is the objective of this paper.
The structure of this work is as follows. Section 2 presents a concise literature review on the theory of interactions. It points out the main issues to take into consideration while studying military expenditure interactions within a given region. Section 3 presents a critical discussion on the data used in this study and their sources. In section 4 we explore the cross-sectional dependence of military expenditures using various econometric techniques. We identify how many common factors are important to explain military expenditures in the MENA region using the Principal Component Analysis. In Section 5 we evaluate the interpretation of the estimated factors using the multiple-indicator multiple-cause model. Section 6 contains some conclusions.
THE THEORY OF MILITARY INTERACTIONS
The theory of military interactions broadly falls into two groups, arms races and alliances, which are usually not integrated 1 . However, in regional systems they are likely to overlap with each others, because they both contribute to shape the same defence demand function. A general specification for the military activity demand of country i, M i is and Intriligator (1995) and Intriligator and Brito (2000) ). Within the context of MENA countries, causal analysis have found evidence of arms races between Israel and its neighbouring countries. Linden (1991) and Seiglie and Liu (2002) only on arms race behaviours these models offer a partial vision of many of the complexities and interrelations occurring in regional systems, including the collective action among the historical enemies of Israel (e.g. Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria). Furthermore third parties and regional events often play a crucial role in shaping military expenditure interactions within a given region.
The importance of third party influences was first noted by Rosh (1998) . He introduced the concept of Security Web, in which a nation's security is made dependent on the military capability of other influential countries. Dunne, Perlo-Freeman, and Smith (2008) point out many of the econometric issues involved in estimating military demand equations in regional systems. Their example is explanatory: they present the military demand equation for 3 actors, i is an enemy, j and k two allies:
where β e captures the arms race effect and β a captures the spillover effect from the alliance. The existence of common factors which simultaneously affect all the countries and patterns of threat and alliance driven by strategic concerns in the region will make the error terms correlated, which has important consequences for estimation.
In the defence literature on the Middle East, Lebovic and Ishaq (1987) offer an early example where security needs of a country are dependent on the military capabilities of all its neighbouring countries. They weight these needs by the geographical distance between countries. The regional perspective has been attracting increasing attention, especially to assess damaging spatial spillovers of civil wars and arms build-ups, like in Murdoch and Sandler (2002) and Collier and Hoeffler (2004) . These methods require that the spatial link matrix be known, whereas modern panel-data techniques may allow the links to be estimated.
THE DATA
Determining how much is spent on defence entails difficult measurement issues. These problems are avoided by expressing military expenditures as a share of GDP. The shares capture the resources devoted to the military, that is they are measures of the priority a country is giving to defence. This is discussed in Dunne and Smith (2007) . Also, since prices are unavailable and excluded from the demand equation, using the shares imposes the implicit assumption that the conditional price and income elasticities of demand for military expenditures are equal to unity.
While this is a strong assumption, it is convenient for our purposes, since the use of shares of military expenditure in GDP captures ability to pay in a parsimonious way. A fuller discussion of tests of this assumption is available from the author.
We use data on the shares of military expenditures from the online SIPRI dataset for the period 1988-2007 and a number of SIPRI Yearbooks for the preceding years (Yearbooks 1980 (Yearbooks , 1985 (Yearbooks , 1986 (Yearbooks , 1988 (Yearbooks , and 1989 
INVESTIGATING CROSS-COUNTRY DEPENDENCE
Common unmeasured shocks that influence all countries, similarly or to different degrees, introduce an unobserved heterogeneity in panel time-series models, which introduce cross-sectional dependence or correlation between the errors. If these common shocks are correlated with the regressors, the conventional estimators are biased and inconsistent. The literature has suggested several techniques to control for cross-sectional dependence, whose appropriateness depends upon the problem at hand and whether particular assumptions are met. These techniques include:
1. SURE-GLS estimation: for N < T (otherwise the disturbance covariance matrix is rank defi-cient); however, pooled and GLS estimators are biased and inconsistent if the dependence is due to common omitted variables correlated with the country-specific regressors.
2. Two-way Fixed Effect estimator this estimator is unbiased and efficient if the country slopes and variances are homogeneous (β i = β; σ
. In addition, only one single common unobserved factor is allowed which impacts on all countries identically. This latter effect will manifest in a time parameter.
3. Orthogonalisation. (2007)).
Since the MENA region is interconnected and shares important economical and political trends, there are likely to be some common factors which affect the military expenditures of all countries in the region.
This section aims to answer two questions:
1. How much commonalities are there in the region?
2. Is it possible to interpret them?
If there are strategic unobserved factors that impact military expenditures on all the region, the model may be written as The correlation matrix among the residuals, say |ρ v ij | is an indicator of the degree of cross-sectional dependence. The presence of unobserved factors may shape these correlations so that the matrix may reveal some specific patterns among the residuals. We use the residuals from an ability-to-pay model: the model is a log-linear specification as follows
Military expenditure shares, s it , are explained by the availability of resources, y it , and a time relations with all the countries in the region or almost no correlation at all. This may suggest a different behaviour of these countries within the region. We conclude that the residual matrix suggests some evidence of cross-country dependence. We propose various econometric techniques to quantify and interpret the factors that lead to this cross-sectional dependence.
We also investigated endogenous structural breaks using the Quandt-Andrews test. While there was substantial evidence for structural breaks, which is consistent with there being unobserved common factors, it was difficult to interpret the pattern across the region. A break-event correspondence suggests that the first break often corresponds with domestic political confrontations.
We also experimented with the Common Correlated Effect estimator (CCE), see Pesaran (2006) , which involves augmenting the model with cross-sectional averages of the dependent and independent variables. It was difficult to give the results a clear interpretation; however, they helped to understand that the common factors in the region do not have a common weight. These are areas for further research.
The Analysis of Principal Components
The Firstly, we apply the PCA to the military expenditures expressed as a share of GDP and to the levels of military expenditures. In model s it = x it β i + f t γ i + it the PCA sets β i = 0. Secondly, we apply the PCA on the residual matrix from the ability-to-pay model in equation (1) . This allows β i = 0 but assumes the factors to be independent of x it .
PCA on the military shares
We compute the PCs on the military expenditures expressed as shares of GDP. Due to data availability we restrict the sample to 15 MENA countries over the period 1979-2007. This is because a technical requirement to apply the PCA is to have a balanced panel of observations.
The PCA on the shares shows that 4 unobserved factors explain 87% of the sample variation. Table 1 reports the variance and the cumulative variance for each eigenvalue greater than 1. The first two components are the most important as they explain higher proportions of the variance. The loadings biplot in Figure( The second component has a strong negative value for Bahrain, Kuwait, UAE and Egypt; a negative but close to zero value for Oman, Tunisia, and Saudi Arabia. Jordan has a close to zero positive value. The group of countries with positive loadings includes: Algeria, Iran, Israel, Morocco, Syria, Turkey and Yemen. We see two patterns in the analysis of this component. The negative loadings seem to pertain to oil-rich countries or aid-recipients. This suggests that the second component picks up the effect of domestic resource availability. It remains to be understood the position of Israel, which is an exception in this group given its resources.
A second line of interpretation suggests that the second component is related to a security concern.
The group of countries with positive loadings shares histories of violent internal upheavals: Algeria experienced the civil war, Iran went through a Revolution, Israel faced clashes with the Palestinians, Morocco fought forms of opposition to the monarchy, Syria and Yemen had episodic outbursts of violence, Turkey fought its Kurdish minority. This uncertainty is related to the difficulty in interpreting the estimated factors. This is the main limitation of the PCA: we will discuss this at the end of this section.
We are more inclined toward the first interpretation: the reason relies on the two outliers observations picked up by the plot. The score labels in Figure(1 We also compute the PCs on the log of the shares: this gives similar results despite the correlations are less strong. This is due to the log operator which smoothes the variance of the data matrix.
PCA on the residuals
Residual Principal Components (RPCs) may be introduced in a panel model to deal with crosssectional dependence as it is suggested in Coakley, Fuertes, and Smith (2002) . This consists in augmenting the regression model by the RPCs to proxy the unobserved factors. This procedure gives consistent estimates of the parameters of interest if the unobserved factors do not influence
x it or there are no factor that influence x it but not y it .
We explore this procedure by extracting the PCs from the residual matrix from the ability-to-pay model (1) as above:
Our sample covers the period 1991-2007 since Yemen has missing values for income until 1989.
Thus the residuals from the dynamic model are computed from 1991.
The analysis shows the presence of 5 factors explaining 79% of the total residual variation; again, the first two factors are the most significant (46% of the residual variation is explained) and the fifth factor is marginal ( Table 2 
Conclusions and discussion
The PCA is a useful tool to learn more about the underlying structure of the data and to uncover the role unobserved factors play in determining the variation of some observed variables.
The PCA on military expenditures in 15 MENA countries brings evidence that there is a great (1) degree of commonality within the region.
Despite the evidence supporting the presence of two main unobserved factors explaining the variation of military expenditures in the region, the interpretation of them can only be tentative. The difficulty arises from the fact that there are a large number of similar factors, which have a different weight in each country. These factors can be geopolitical shocks related to the intensity of political tensions in the area, or economic shocks related to availability of resources. The first group includes the Arab-Israeli conflict, the high number of violent internal disputes (Islamist oppositions, the Islamic Revolution in Iran), the Iran-Iraq war, the Cold War and sub-regional security priorities.
The second group includes oil revenues and aid inflows. The clear identification of these factors and their weights is difficult. The PCA has a number of limitations in this respect. To trace down the loadings we need to impose just-identifying restrictions since any non-singular transformation gives observationally equivalent factors and loadings: X = (F P −1 )(P Λ) + E. Therefore, unless we know the weights that the matrix P attributes to each factor, there may be infinite linear combinations for each factor. Identification is usually achieved by a normalisation assumption (e.g.
P P = I).
This raises a concern about the interpretation of the factors because the normalisation needs not have an economic meaning. Interpreting the estimated factors may be possible with relatively sample structures, nevertheless it is always tentative.
In the context of RPCs this is also true. The limitations of the RPC approach are explained in details in Coakley, Fuertes, and Smith (2002) . This difficulty creates the need to explain these common factors together.
MIMIC MODEL
The multiple-indicator multiple-cause (MIMIC) model aims to measure latent variables using observable variables. Since the common shocks are unknown, they cannot be quantified directly.
The MIMIC model considers that latent factors are reflected in some "indicators" and influenced by some "causal" variables. The framework relates the latent variables to their observable "indicators" and "causes" to give an empirical measure of such unobservable factors. Spanos (1984) offers an application to the case of liquidity and Pieroni and d'Agostino (2009) for a latent index of corruption.
The Principal Component Analysis in the previous section identified two main unobserved factors which explain most of the cross-country variation in military expenditure shares. The political economy of the region and empirical studies suggest a number of "causes" for this cross-country dependence. The MIMIC model enables to validate which observable variables account for these common factors.
The model specification
The MIMIC model applied in this paper can be presented as follows. Let the latent variable be ξ t , a 2 × 1 vector of unobserved factors and s t a 15 × 1 vector of shares of military expenditures, as 15 are the countries included in the sample. These latter are our "indicators" variables. Let z t be a 4 × 1 vector of potential regional 'causes' of the detected commonalities in the region. The MIMIC model consists of two relationships: a behavioural equation
where t ∼ IN (0, σ 2 ). And the measurement equation
where
Equations (2) and (3) are two systems of equations for t = 1, 2, ..., T .
The reduced form of this system is
When estimating the reduced form (5), we are a-priori imposing the restrictions Π = Λβ and Ω = Λσ 2 Λ + Σ. To identify all the MIMIC parameters (β, Λ, σ 2 , Σ) we need to be able to solve these two sets of equations.
We follow the MIMIC estimation procedure suggested by Spanos (1984) . We proceed in two steps.
First, we ignore the restrictions Π = Λβ and estimate Λ and Σ through the Principal Component Analysis 6 . Using these estimates (Λ andΣ) we estimate the unobserved ξ as the scores of the Principal Components. Secondly, we try to identify the form of the behavioral equation (2) by regressingξ on z t . This gives estimates ofβ (asβ = (z z) −1 z ξ ) which satisfy the restrictions Π = Λβ. Separately we estimate the reduced form parameters in equation (5) . If the two sets of estimates,β and the reduced form coefficients, do not differ much we can infer that equation (2) is a common behavioural equation for the military expenditure shares in the MENA region. This comparison will be informative about the validity of our interpretation of the regional common factors 7 .
Empirical results
Our vector of "causes" include oil prices, the average GDP of the region for year t, foreign assistance and a conflict dummy variable 8 . This choice is based on the economic theory and data availability. The first three variables represent sources of economic shocks, while the conflict dummy is a proxy for insecurity.
The political economy of the region suggests that oil prices is the most direct economic factor influencing government revenues in the region (Richards and Waterbury (2008) ). National income constrains the resources a country can afford to pay for the military. Oil prices can also reflect instability in the region since it is not rare that oil-price hikes correspond with political events. For example, the 1979 price drama reflects the Iranian Revolution and the outcomes of the Camp David
Accords. The average GDP is strictly related to the ability to pay and it can be a proxy for economic development. Aid inflows to the region affect the availability of government resources. Two kind of arguments have been offered for the relationship between aid and military expenditures. One is that aid is fungible (Devarajan and Swaroop (1998) ) so that cash inflows can be diverted to purposes other than those originally targeted, such as the acquisition of weapons. The other is that aid may have important macroeconomic side-effects (such as inflationary pressures and overvaluation of the exchange rate) in a Dutch Disease fashion or impact negatively on the rate of investment (Heller (2005) and Gupta and Heller (2002) ). These effects are detrimental to growth and development, dwarfing the possibilities of public expenditures and hence, defence outlays.
The conflict dummy is a proxy for political shocks. The conflict dummy is set to 1 for those years in which there is an armed conflict in any part of the region. It should capture some form of "threat" in the region which gears the "demand for security" of these countries. Table 3 shows the results of the parameter estimates of the MIMIC model. The dependent variables are the two most important factors estimated by the PCA on the shares of military expenditures.
Two specifications are presented for each factor: specification 1 is preferred in both cases based on the goodness of fit measures.
The first factor is significantly determined by oil price fluctuations and regional average GDP.
The level of government revenues, as measured by the oil price fluctuations, shows a significant positive relationship with the first factor. This supports the argument that oil prices and regional insecurity are positively related. In insecure environments, additional resources coming from oilprice increases may result in larger sizes of military sectors. The size of the coefficient is close to the average of the oil parameters for the single-country regressions (equations 5). So the estimate for β oil in Table 3 may be a compromise among the single country values. One explanation for the very small size of the estimate of GDP is that regional average GDP is not a good proxy for the level of economic development 9 . This is also similar to the results from the reduced form equations.
This may suggest that average regional income has negligible influence in explaining the common factors.
The conflict variable and aid inflows have no significant effect on the first factor. The analysis shows they are significant determinants of the second factor. Aid inflows show a significant and negative relation with the second factor. The previous analysis has suggested the second factor to be related to the ability-to-pay of these countries. The negative sign may represent the fact that massive aid, especially if tied, may limit the discretionality of public expenditures. The regional conflict variable has also a significant and negative sign. In the single-country equations the conflict dummy is positive for 6 countries and negative for 9 countries. This may suggest that different countries react differently to regional insecurity threats. Equation (4) on model (5) . We cannot test these restrictions directly on the covariance-matrix. This is because the residual covariance matrix from model (4) is singular due to the fact that the PCs are linear combinations of the military expenditure shares. An alternative solution is a comparison of the two sets of equations. This is equivalent to say whether the estimated factors explain the shares of military expenditures better or worse than the observed variables. If the factors capture completely the influences of the observed "causes" (i.e. oil prices, average regional income, conflict and aid), a direct estimation on the observed variables will perform better. On the contrary, if the estimated components capture different factors influencing the shares (e.g., Islamic oppositions threatening stability) there are advantages in including the factors in a panel regression. In the latter case there are two channels that influence the shares: the observed variables on one side and the factors on the other side.
The regression results suggest that the restricted model has a better fit. This is measured by the Standard Error of Regression (SER). Over the region, the SER for the two specifications are as follows:
.48
This may suggest that there are unobserved factors, other than the "causes" included, that influence the shares of military expenditures in the MENA region directly. Hence, these are better accounted for by the estimated components.
CONCLUSIONS
In alliance and arms race behaviours and, to a substantial degree, internal political influences.
